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Abstract. We present a formal model of negotiation between au-
tonomous agents. The purpose of the negotiation is to reach an agreement
about the provision of a service by one agent for another. The model de-
ﬁnes a range of strategies and tactics that agents can employ to generate
initial oﬀers, evaluate proposals and oﬀer counter proposals. The model
is based on computationally tractable assumptions and is demonstrated
in the domain of business process management. Initial proofs about the
convergence of negotiation are also presented.
1 Introduction
Autonomous agents are being increasingly used in a wide range of industrial and
commercial domains [2]. These agents have a high degree of self determination –
they decide for themselves what, when and under what conditions their actions
should be performed. In most cases, such agents need to interact with other
autonomous agents to achieve their objectives (either because they do not have
suﬃcient capabilities or resources to complete their problem solving alone or
because there are interdependencies between the agents). The objectives of these
interactions are to make other agents undertake a particular course of action
(e.g. perform a particular service), modify a planned course of action (e.g. delay
or bring forward a particular action so that there is no longer a conﬂict), or
come to an agreement on a common course of action. Since the agents have
no direct control over one another, they must persuade their acquaintances to
act in particular ways (they cannot simply instruct them). The paradigm case
of persuasion is negotiation – a process by which a joint decision is made by
two or more parties. The parties ﬁrst verbalise contradictory demands and then
move towards agreement by a process of concession making or search for new
alternatives, (cf. [3]).
Given its pervasive nature, negotiation comes in many shapes and forms.
However in this work we are interested in a particular class of negotiation –
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namely service-oriented negotiation. In this context, one agent (the client) re-
quires a service to be performed on its behalf by some other agent (the server)2.
Negotiation involves determining a contract under certain terms and conditions.
The negotiation may be iterative in that several rounds of oﬀers and counter
oﬀers will occur before an agreement is reached or the negotiation is terminated.
When building an autonomous agent which is capable of ﬂexible and sophisti-
cated negotiation, three broad areas need to be considered [7] – what negotiation
protocol will be used?, what are the issues over which negotiation takes place?,
and what reasoning model will the agents employ? This paper concentrates pre-
dominantly on the ﬁnal point although the protocol and negotiation object are
brieﬂy deﬁned. A comprehensive reasoning model for service-oriented negoti-
ation should determine: which potential servers should be contacted, whether
negotiation should proceed in parallel with all servers or whether it should run
sequentially, what initial oﬀers should be sent out, what is the range of acceptable
agreements, what counter oﬀers should be generated, when negotiation should
be abandoned, and when an agreement is reached.
This paper presents a formal account of a negotiating agent’s reasoning com-
ponent –in particular it concentrates on the processes of generating an initial
oﬀer, of evaluating incoming proposals, and of generating counter proposals.
The model speciﬁes the key structures and processes involved in this endeavour
and deﬁnes their inter-relationships. The model was shaped by practical consid-
erations and insights emanating from the development of a system of negotiating
agents for business process management (see [5] and Section 2 for more details).
The main contributions of this work are: (i) it allows rich and ﬂexible negotia-
tion schemes to be deﬁned; (ii) it is based on assumptions which are realistic for
autonomous computational agents (see Section 3.2 for the set of requirements
and Section 7 for a discussion of related approaches); and (iii) it presents some
initial results on the convergence of negotiation (see Section 6).
In this paper we concentrate on many-parties, many-issues, single-encounter
negotiations with an environment of limited resources (time among them). Sec-
tion 2 gives details of the type of applications and scenarios we are interested in.
Sections 3 to 5 present the proposed model. Finally, some results on negotiation
convergence and future avenues of work are outlined.
2 Service-Oriented Negotiation
This section characterises a context in which service oriented negotiation takes
place. The scenario is motivated by work in the ADEPT project [5] which has de-
veloped negotiating agents for business process management applications. How-
ever, we believe that the characteristics emerging from this domain have a wide
variety of application. To provide a detailed context for this work, a multi-agent
2 A service is a problem solving activity which has clearly deﬁned start and end points.
Examples include diagnosing a fault, buying a group of shares in the stock market,
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system for managing a British Telecom (BT) business process is presented (sec-
tion 2.1). This scenario is then analysed in terms of its key characteristics and
assumptions as they relate to the process of negotiation (section 2.2).
2.1 BT’s Provide Customer Quote Business Process
This scenario is based on BT’s business process of providing a quotation for
designing a network to provide particular services to a customer (ﬁgure 1)3. The
overall process receives a customer service request as its input and generates as
its output a quote specifying how much it would cost to build a network to realise
that service. It involves up to six agent types: the sales department agent, the
customer service division agent, the legal department agent, the design division
agent, the surveyor department agent, and the various agents who provide the
out-sourced service of vetting customers.
Fig.1. Agent system for BT’s provide customer quote business process.
3 The negotiations between the agents are denoted by arrows (arrow head toward
client) and the service involved in the negotiation is juxtaposed to the respective
arrow. 
The process is initiated by the sales agent which negotiates with the CSD
agent (mainly over time, but also over the number of invocations and the form in
which the ﬁnal result should be delivered) for the service of providing a customer
quote. The ﬁrst stages of the Provide Customer Quote service involve the CSD
agent capturing the customer’s details and vetting the customer in terms of their
credit worthiness. The latter sub-service is actually performed by one of the VC
agents. Negotiation is used to determine which VC agent should be selected – the
main attributes which are negotiated over are the price of the service, the penalty
for contract violation, the desired quality of the service and the time by which the
service should be performed. If the customer fails the vetting procedure, then the
quote process terminates. Assuming the customer is satisfactory, the CSD agent
maps their requirements against a service portfolio. If the requirements can be
met by a standard oﬀ-the-shelf portfolio item then an immediate quote can be
oﬀered based on previous examples. In the case of bespoke services, however, the
process is more complex. The CSD agent negotiates with the DD agent (over time
and quality) for the service of designing and costing the desired network service.
In order for the DD agent to provide this service it must negotiate with the LD
agent (over time) and perhaps with the SD agent. The LD agent checks the design
to ensure the legality of the proposed service (e.g. it is illegal to send unauthorised
encrypted messages across France). If the desired service is illegal, then the entire
quote process terminates and the customer is informed. If the requested service
is legal then the design phase can start. To prepare a network design it is usually
necessary to have a detailed plan of the existing equipment at the customer’s
premises. Sometimes such plans might not exist and sometimes they may be out
of date. In either case, the DD agent determines whether the customer site(s)
should be surveyed. If such a survey is warranted, the DD agent negotiates with
the SD agent (over price and time) for the Survey Customer Site service. On
completion of the network design and costing, the DD agent informs the CSD
agent which informs the customer of the service quote. The business process
then terminates.
The structure of the negotiation object is based almost directly on the legal
contracts used to regulate agreements in the current manual approach to busi-
ness process management. This structure is fairly rich and covers both service
and meta-service attributes. In more detail, it contains: (i) the service name; (ii)
a unique agreement identiﬁer (covering the case where there are multiple agree-
ments for the same service); (iii) the agents involved in the agreement (client
and server); (iv) the type of agreement (one oﬀ agreement for a single service
invocation versus on-going agreements for multiple invocations of the same ser-
vice); (v) timing information (duration represents the maximum time the server
can take to ﬁnish the service, and start time and end time represent the time
during which the agreement is valid); (vi) the volume of invocations permissible
between the start and end times (for on-going agreements only); (vii) the price
paid per invocation; (viii) the penalty the server incurs for every violation of the
agreement; (ix) the information the client must provide to the server on service
invocation; and (x) the policy used for disseminating the service’s intermediate  
and ﬁnal results to the client.
2.2 Characteristics and Assumptions
The following negotiation characteristics can be noted from the ADEPT business
process scenario. Moreover, it is believed that these characteristics are common
to a wide range of service oriented negotiations between autonomous agents.
– A given service can be provided by more than one agent (e.g. multiple agents
can provide the vet customer service to the CSD agent). The available ser-
vices may be identical in their characteristics or they may vary along several
dimensions (e.g. quality, price, availability, etc.).
– Individual agents can be both clients and servers for diﬀerent services in
diﬀerent negotiation contexts.
– Negotiations can range over a number of quantitative (e.g. price, duration,
and cost) and qualitative (e.g. type of reporting policy, and nature of the
contract) issues. Each successful negotiation requires a range of such issues
to be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. Agents may be required to
make trade-oﬀs between issues (e.g. faster completion time for lower quality)
in order to come to an agreement.
– The social context and inter-relationships of the participants inﬂuences the
way agents negotiate. Some negotiations involve entities within the same
organisation (e.g. between the CSD and DD agents) and hence are gener-
ally cooperative in nature. Other negotiations are inter-organisational and
purely competitive – involving self interested, utility maximising agents (e.g.
between the VC agents and the CSD agent). Some groups of agents often ne-
gotiate with one another for the same service (e.g. the CSD and DD agents),
whereas other negotiations are more open in nature (for example, the set
of VC agents changes frequently and hence the CSD agent often negotiates
with unknown agents).
– As the agents are autonomous, the factors which inﬂuence their negotia-
tion stance and behaviour are private and not available to their opponents
(especially in inter-organisational settings). Thus agents do not know what
utilities their opponents place on various outcomes, they do not know what
reasoning models they employ, they do not know their opponent’s constraints
and they do not know whether an agreement is even possible at the outset
(i.e. the participants may have non-intersecting ranges of acceptability).
– Since negotiation takes place within a highly intertwined web of activity
(the business process) time is a critical factor. Timings are important on
two distinct levels: (i) the time it takes to reach an agreement must be rea-
sonable; and (ii) the time by which the negotiated service must be executed
is important in most cases and crucial in others. The former means that
the agents should not become involved in unnecessarily complex and time
consuming negotiations – the time spent negotiating should be reasonable
with respect to the value of the service agreement. The latter means that the
agents sometimes have hard deadlines by which agreements must be in place      
(this occurs mainly when multiple services need to be combined or closely
coordinated).
3 The Negotiation Model
The negotiation model for autonomous agents proposed in this Section is based
on a variation of the two parties, many issues value scoring system presented
in [8]. That is, a model for bilateral negotiations about a set of quantitative
variables. Our variation transforms that model into a many parties, many issues
model (that is, multilateral negotiations about a set of variables). Multilateral
negotiations are central to the application domains we are interested in. Our
model of multilateral negotiations is based on a set of mutually inﬂuencing two
parties, many issues negotiations. We will call the sequence of oﬀers and counter-
oﬀers in a two-party negotiation a negotiation thread. Oﬀers and counter oﬀers
are generated by lineal combinations of simple functions, called tactics. Tactics
generate an oﬀer, or counter oﬀer, for a single component of the negotiation
object using a single criteria (time, resources, etc.). Diﬀerent weights in the
lineal combination allow the varying importance of the criteria to be modelled.
For example, when determining values of slots in the negotiation object it may
initially be more important to take into account the other agent’s behaviour than
the remaining time. In which case, the tactics that emphasize the behaviour of
other agents will be given greater preference than the tactics which base their
value on the amount of time remaining.
To achieve ﬂexibility in the negotiation, the agents may wish to change their
ratings of the importance of the diﬀerent criteria over time. For example, remain-
ing time may become more relevant than the imitation of the other’s behaviour
as the time by which an agreement must be in place approaches. We use the
term “strategy” to denote the way in which an agent changes the weights of the
diﬀerent tactics over time. Thus strategies combine tactics depending on the
history of negotiations and the mental state of agents, and negotiation threads
inﬂuence one another by means of strategies (see Section 6).
Before presenting our model, we introduce Raiﬀa’s basic model for bilateral
negotiation [8].
3.1 The bilateral negotiation model
Let i (i ∈{ a,b}) represent the negotiating agents and j (j ∈{ 1,...,n}) the issues
under negotiation. Let xj ∈ [minj,maxj] be a value for issue j. Here we consider
issues for which negotiation amounts to determining a value between a delimited
range. Each agent has a scoring function V i
j :[ minj,maxj] → [0,1] that gives
the score agent i assigns to a value of issue j in the range of its acceptable values.
For convenience, scores are kept in the interval [0,1].
The next element of the model is the relative importance that an agent
assigns to each issue under negotiation. wi
j is the importance of issue j for agent
i. We assume the weights of both agents are normalized, i.e.
 
1≤j≤n wi
j =1 ,       
for all i in {a,b}. With these elements in place, it is now possible to deﬁne an
agent’s scoring function4 for a contract – that is, for a value x =( x1,...,xn)i n
the multi-dimensional space deﬁned by the issues’ value ranges:
V i(x)=
 
1≤j≤n
wi
jV i
j (xj)
If both negotiators use such an additive scoring function, it is possible to
show how to compute the optimum value of x as an element on the eﬃcient
frontier of negotiation5 (see [8], p. 164).
3.2 Service-oriented negotiation requirements
The above mentioned model for bilateral negotiation is valid for some service
oriented settings. However, the model contains several implicit assumptions that,
although they permit good optimisation results, are inappropriate for our sce-
narios:
1. Privacy of information. To ﬁnd the optimum value, the scoring functions
have to be disclosed. This is, in general, inappropriate for competitive nego-
tiation.
2. Privacy of models. Both negotiators have to use the same additive scoring
model. However, the models used to evaluate oﬀers and generate counter
oﬀers are one of the things that negotiators try to hide from one another.
3. Value restrictions. There are pre-deﬁned value regions for discussion (they
are necessary to deﬁne the limits of the scoring function). However, it is not
always possible to ﬁnd these common regions and in many cases negotiation
actually involves determining whether such regions even exist.
4. Time restrictions. There is no notion of timing issues in the negotiation.
However, time is a major constraint on the agent’s behaviour [6]. This is
mainly true on the client side; agents often have strict deadlines by when the
negotiation must be completed. For instance, a video link has to be provided
at 16:00 because at that time a conference should start; negotiation about
set up cannot continue after that instant in time.
5. Resource restrictions. There is no notion of resource issues in the negotia-
tion. However, the quantity of a particular resource has a strong and direct
inﬂuence on the behaviour of agents, and, moreover, the correct appreciation
of the remaining resources is an essential characteristic of good negotiators.
Resources from the client point of view relate directly with the number of
servers engaging in negotiations; likewise from the server’s point of view.
Thus, the quantity of resource has a similar eﬀect on the agents’ behaviour
as time.
4 Non-linear approaches to modelling utility could be used if necessary without aﬀect-
ing the basic ideas of the model.
5 Any contract not on this frontier is sub-optimal (i.e. not pareto-optimal) in that
possible mutual gains are missed.      
Taking the ﬁrst consideration alone, it is clear that optimal solution cannot
be found in our domains: it is not possible to optimize an unknown function.
Hence, we shall propose a model for individual agent negotiation that looks for
deals acceptable to its acquaintances but which, nevertheless, maximises the
agent’s own scoring function.
3.3 A service-oriented negotiation model
In service oriented negotiations, agents exhibit two possible behaviours that are,
in principle, in conﬂict. Hence we shall distinguish (for notational convenience)
two subsets of agents6, Agents = Clients ∪ Servers. We use roman letters to
represent agents; c,c1,c 2,... will stand for clients, s,s1,s 2,... for servers and
a,a1,b,d,e,...for unspeciﬁc agents.
We adhere to an additive scoring system in which, for simplicity, the function
V a
j is either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing.
Clients and service providers may have mutual interest for particular vari-
ables. For example, Raiﬀa cites an example [8, pg. 133–147] in which the Police
Oﬃcers Union and the City Hall realize, in the course of their negotiations, that
they both want the police commissioner ﬁred. Having recognised this mutual in-
terest they quickly agree that this course of action should be selected. However,
in general, clients and servers have opposing interests, e.g. a client wants a low
price for a service, whereas his potential servers attempt to obtain the highest
price. High quality is desired by clients but not by servers, and so on. Therefore,
in the space of negotiation values, negotiators represent opposing forces in each
one of the dimensions. In consequence, the scoring functions verify that given a
client c and a server s negotiating values for issue j, then if xj,y j ∈ [minj,maxj]
and xj ≥ yj then (V c
j (xj) ≥ V c
j (yj)i ﬀV s
j (xj) ≤ V s
j (yj)).
In contrast, where there is a mutual interest, a variable will be assigned one
of its extreme values. Hence these variables can be taken out of the negotiation
set. For instance, the act of ﬁring the police commisioner can be removed from
the set of issues under negotiation and assigned the extreme value ”done”.
Once the agents have determined the set of variables over which they will
negotiate, the negotiation process between two agents a,b ∈ Agents consists of
an alternate succession of oﬀers and counter oﬀers of values for these variables.
This continues until an oﬀer or counter oﬀer is accepted by the other side or one
of the partners terminates negotiation (e.g. because the time deadline is reached
without an agreement being in place). Negotiation can be initiated by clients or
servers.
We represent by xt
a→b the vector of values proposed by agent a to agent b
at time t, and by xt
a→b[j] the value for issue j proposed from a to b at time
t. The range of values acceptable to agent a for issue j will be represented as
the interval [mina
j,maxa
j]. For convenience, we assume a common global time
(the calendar time) represented by a linearly ordered set of instants, namely
6 The subsets are not disjoint since an agent can participate as a client in one negoti-
ation and as a service provider in another.         
Time, and a reliable communication medium introducing no delays in message
transmission (so we can assume that emission and reception times are identical).
The common time assumption is not too strong for our application domains,
because time granularity and oﬀer and counter oﬀers frequencies are not too
high. Then,
Deﬁnition1. A Negotiation Thread between agents a,b ∈ Agents,a t
time t ∈ Time, noted xt
a↔b or xt
b↔a, is any ﬁnite sequence of the form
{x
t1
d1→e1,x
t2
d2→e2,...,x
tn
dn→en} where:
1. ei = di+1, proposals are alternate between both agents,
2. tk ≤ tl if k ≤ l, ordered over time,
3. di,e i ∈{ a,b}, the thread contains only proposals between agents a and b,
4. di  = ei, the proposals are between agents, and
5. x
ti
di→ei[j] ∈ [min
di
j ,max
di
j ] or is one of the particles {accept,reject}.
Superindex tn represents an instant in the set Time such that tn ≤ t. We will
say that a negotiation thread is active7 if x
tn
dn→en / ∈{ accept,reject}.
For simplicity in the notation, we assume in the sequel that t1 corresponds
to the initial time value, that is t1 = 0. In other words, there is a local time for
each negotiation thread, that starts with the utterance of the ﬁrst oﬀer. When
agent a receives an oﬀer from agent b at time t, that is xt
b→a, it has to rate the
oﬀer using its scoring function. If the value of V a(xt
b→a) is greater than the value
of the counter oﬀer agent a is ready to send at the time t  when the evaluation
is performed, that is, xt
 
a→b with t  >t , then agent a accepts. Otherwise, the
counter oﬀer is submitted. The interpretation function Ia expresses this concept
more formally:
Deﬁnition2. Given an agent a and its associated scoring function V a, the
interpretation by agent a at time t  of an oﬀer xt
b→a sent at time t<t  ,i s
deﬁned as:
Ia(t ,x t
b→a)=
 
accept If V a(xt
b→a) ≥ V a(xt
 
a→b)
xt
 
a→b otherwise
where xt
 
a→b is the contract that agent a would oﬀer to b at the time of the
interpretation.
The result of Ia(t ,x t
b→a) is used to extend the current negotiation thread
between the agents. This interpretation also models the fact that a contract
unacceptable today can be accepted tomorrow merely by the fact that time has
passed.
In order to prepare a counter oﬀer, xt
 
a→b, agent a uses a set of tactics that
generate new values for each variable in the negotiation set. Based on the needs of
7 We assume that any oﬀer is valid (that is, the agent that uttered it is commited)
until a counter oﬀer is received. If the response time is relevant it can be included in
the set of issues under negotiation.       
our business process applications (Section 2), we developed the following families
of tactics:
1. Time-dependent. If an agent has a time deadline by which an agreement
must be in place, these tactics model the fact that the agent is likely to
concede more rapidly as the deadline approaches. The shape of the curve
of concession, a function depending on time, is what diﬀerentiates tactics in
this set.
2. Resource-dependent. These tactics model the pressure in reaching an
agreement that (i) the limited resources –e.g. remaining bandwidth to be
allocated, money, or any other– and (2) the environment –number of clients,
number of servers or economic parameters– impose upon the agent’s be-
haviour. The functions in this set are similar to the time dependent functions
except that the domain of the function is the quantity of resources available
instead of the remaining time.
3. Imitative. In situations in which the agent is not under a great deal of
pressure to reach an agreement, it may choose to use imitative tactics that
protect it from being exploited by other agents. In this case, the counter
oﬀer depends on the behaviour of the negotiation opponent. The tactics in
this family diﬀer in which aspect of their opponent’s behaviour they imitate,
and to what degree the opponent’s behaviour is imitated.
We do not claim that these family types are complete, nor that we have
enumerated all possible instances of tactics within a given family. These are
merely the types of tactics we found useful in our applications.
4 Negotiation tactics
Tactics are the set of functions that determine how to compute the value of a
quantitative issue (price, volume, duration, ...), by considering a single criteria
(time, resources, ...). The set of values for the negotiation issue are then the
range of the function, and the single criteria is its domain. The criteria we have
chosen for the application domain, as explained in the previous section, are time,
resources and previous oﬀers and counter oﬀers.
Given that agents may want to consider more than one criterion to compute
the value for a single issue, we model the generation of counter proposals as a
weighted combination of diﬀerent tactics covering the set of criteria. The values
so computed for the diﬀerent issues8 will be the elements of the counter proposal.
For instance, if an agent wants to counter propose taking into account two cri-
teria: the remaining time and the previous behaviour of the opponent, it can
select two tactics: boulware (sec. 4.1, based on the remaining time, and Tit-For-
Tat (sec. 4.3) to imitate the behaviour of the oponent. Each of the so selected
tactics will suggest a value to counter propose for the issue under negotiation.
8 values for issues may be computed by diﬀerent weighted combinations of tactics.        
The actual value which is counter proposed will be the weighted combination of
the two suggested values.
Given an issue j, for which a value is under negotiation, an agent a’s initial
oﬀer corresponds to a value in the issue’s acceptable region, that is, a value in
[mina
j,maxa
j]. For instance, a client with a range [£0,£20] for the price p to pay
for a good may start the negotiation process by oﬀering the server £10 –what
initial oﬀer should be chosen is something the agent can learn by experience.
The server, with range [£17,£35] may then make an initial counter-oﬀer of
£25. With these two initial values, the strategy of the ﬁrst agent may consist of
using a time-dependent tactic giving £12 –e.g. if it has a short time to reach an
agreement, it will start conceding. And then if the strategy of the latter agent is
to use an imitative tactic, it could generate a counter-proposal of £23 (imitating
the £2 shift of its opponent). And so on.
4.1 Time-dependent tactics
In these tactics, the predominant factor used to decide which value to oﬀer next
is time, t. Thus these tactics consist of varying the acceptance value for the issue
depending on the remaining negotiation time (an important requirement in our
domain –Section 2.2). This requires a constant ta
max in agent a that represents
an instant in the future by when the negotiation must be completed. We model
the initial oﬀer as being a point in the interval of values of the issue under
negotiation. Hence, agents deﬁne a constant κa
j that multiplied by the size of
the interval determines the value of issue j to be oﬀered in the ﬁrst proposal by
agent a.
We model the value to be uttered by agent a to agent b for issue j as the
oﬀer at time t, with 0 ≤ t ≤ ta
max, by a function αa
j depending on time as the
following expression shows:
xt
a→b[j]=
 
mina
j + αa
j(t)(maxa
j − mina
j)I f V a
j is decreasing
mina
j +( 1− αa
j(t))(maxa
j − mina
j)I fV a
j is increasing
A wide range of time-dependent functions can be deﬁned simply by varying
the way in which αa
j(t) is computed. Functions must ensure that 0 ≤ αa
j(t) ≤ 1,
αa
j(0) = κa
j and αa
j(ta
max) = 1. That is, the oﬀer will always be between the
value range, at the beginning it will give the initial constant and when the time
deadline is reached the tactic will suggest to oﬀer the reservation value9. We dis-
tinguish two families of functions with this intended behaviour, polynomial and
exponential. Both families are parameterised by a value β ∈  + that determines
the convexity degree (see Figure 2) of the curve. We have chosen these two fam-
ilies of functions because of the very diﬀerent way they model concession. For
9 The reservation value for issue j of agent a represents the value that gives the smallest
score for function V
a
j . The reservation value for agent a and issue j depends on the
function V
a
j and the range [min
a
j,max
a
j]. If V
a
j is monotonically increasing, then the
reservation value is min
a
j; if it is decreasing the reservation value is max
a
j.         
the same big value of β the polynomial function concedes faster at the beginning
than the exponential one, then they behave similarly. For a small value of β, the
exponential function waits longer to start conceding than the polynomial one.
Many other functions could eventually be deﬁned.
– Polynomial. αa
j(t)=κa
j +( 1− κa
j)(
min(t,tmax)
tmax )
1
β
– Exponential. αa
j(t)=e
(1−
min(t,tmax)
tmax )
β lnκ
a
j
These families of functions represent an inﬁnite number of possible tactics,
one for each value of β. However to better understand their behaviour we have
classiﬁed them, depending on the value of β, into two extreme sets showing
clearly diﬀerent patterns of behaviour. Other sets in between these two could be
deﬁned:
1. Boulware tactics [[8], pg. 48]. Either exponential or polynomial func-
tions with β<1. This tactic maintains the oﬀered value until the time
is almost exhausted, whereupon it concedes up to the reservation value10.
The behaviour of this family of tactics with respect to β is easily un-
derstood taking into account that limβ→0+ e
(1−
min(t,tmax)
tmax )
β lnκ
a
j = κa
j or
limβ→0+ κa
j +( 1− κa
j)(
min(t,tmax)
tmax )
1
β = κa
j.
2. Conceder [[3], pg. 20]. Either exponential or polynomial functions with
β>1. The agent goes to its reservation value very quickly. For similar rea-
sons as before, we have limβ→+∞ e
(1−
min(t,tmax)
tmax )
β lnκ
a
j = 1 or limβ→+∞ κa
j +
(1 − κa
j)(
min(t,tmax)
tmax )
1
β =1 .
4.2 Resource-dependent tactics
These tactics are similar to the time-dependent ones. Indeed time-dependent
tactics can be seen as a type of resource-dependent tactic in which the sole
resource considered is time. Whereas time vanishes constantly up to its end, other
resources may have diﬀerent patterns of usage. We model resource-dependent
tactics in the same way as time-dependent ones, that is, by using the same
functions, but by making the value ta
max dynamic. Its value represents a heuristic
about how many resources are in the environment. The scarcer the resource the
more urgent the need for an agreement to be reached. In our application domains
the most important resource to model is the number of agents negotiating with
a given agent and how keen they are to reach agreements. On one hand, the
greater the number of agents who are negotiating with agent a for a particular
service s, the lower the pressure on agent a to reach an agreement with any
10 Besides the pattern of concession that these functions model, Boulware negotiation
tactics presume that the interval of values for negotiation is very narrow. Hence,
when the deadline is reached and α(tmax) = 1 the oﬀer generated is not substantially
diﬀerent from the initial one.0,5
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Fig.2. Polynomial (left) and Exponential (right) functions for the computation of α(t).
Time is presented as relative to t
a
max.
speciﬁc individual. While on the other hand, the longer the negotiation thread,
the greater the pressure on a to come to an agreement. Hence, representing the
set of agents negotiating with agent a at time t as: Na(t)={i|xt
i↔ais active},
we deﬁne the dynamic time deadline for agent a as:
ta
max = tc + μa |Na(tc)|2
 
i |x
tc
i↔a|
where μa represents the time agent a considers reasonable to negotiate with a
single agent, tc is the current time and |x
tc
i↔a| represents the length of the current
thread between i and a. Notice that the number of agents is in the numerator – so
quantity of time is directly proportional to it, and averaged length of negotiation
thread is in the denominator – so quantity of time is inversely proportional to
it.
4.3 Imitative tactics
This family of tactics compute the next oﬀer based on the previous attitude of
the negotiation opponent. These tactics have proved important in co-operative
problem-solving negotiation settings [1], and so are useful in a subset of our
contexts (see Section 2.2). The main diﬀerence between the tactics in this fam-
ily is in the type of imitation they perform. One family imitates proportion-
ally, another in absolute terms, and the last one computes the average of the
proportions in a number of previous oﬀers. Hence, given a negotiation thread
{...,x
tn−2δ
b→a ,x
tn−2δ+1
a→b ,x
tn−2δ+2
b→a ,...,x
tn−2
b→a,x
tn−1
a→b,x
tn
b→a}, with δ ≥ 1, we distin-
guish the following families of tactics:
1. Relative Tit-For-Tat
The agent reproduces, in percentage terms, the behaviour that its opponent
performed δ ≥ 1 steps ago.        
x
tn+1
a→b[j]=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
min(max(
x
tn−2δ
b→a [j]
x
tn−2δ+2
b→a [j]
x
tn−1
a→b[j],mina
j),maxa
j) n>2δ
mina
j + κa
j(maxa
j − mina
j) n ≤ 2δ,V a
j decr.
mina
j +( 1− κa
j)(maxa
j − mina
j) n ≤ 2δ,V a
j incr.
Depending on the value of the quotient between two consecutive counter
oﬀers, the agent exhibits a range of diﬀerent behaviours: mirror if the quo-
tient is greater than 1, retaliatory if it is lower than 1, and a type of time
independent boulware if it is exactly 1.
2. Random Absolute Tit-For-Tat
The same as before but in absolute terms. It means that if the other agent
decreases its oﬀer by £2, then the next response should be increased by the
same £2. Moreover, we add a component that modiﬁes that behaviour by
increasing or decreasing (depending on the value of parameter s) the value
of the answer by a random amount. (This is introduced as it can enable the
agents to escape from local minima.) M is the maximum amount by which
an agent can change its imitative behaviour.
x
tn+1
a→b[j]=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
min(max(x
tn−1
a→b[j]+( x
tn−2δ
b→a [j] − x
tn−2δ+2
b→a [j])+
+(−1)sR(M),mina
j),maxa
j) n>2δ
mina
j + κa
j(maxa
j − mina
j) n ≤ 2δ,V a
j decr.
mina
j +( 1− κa
j)(maxa
j − mina
j) n ≤ 2δ,V a
j incr.
Where s ∈{ 0,1} and R(M) is a function that generates a random integer
in the interval [0,M].
3. Averaged Tit-For-Tat The agent computes the average of percentages of
changes in a window of size γ ≥ 1 of its opponents history when determining
its new oﬀer. When γ = 1 we have the relative Tit-For-Tat tactic with δ =1 .
x
tn+1
a→b[j]=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
min(max(
x
tn−2
b→a [j]
x
tn−2γ+2
b→a [j]
x
tn−1
a→b[j],mina
j),maxa
j) n>2γ
mina
j + κa
j(maxa
j − mina
j) n ≤ 2γ,V a
j decr.
mina
j +( 1− κa
j)(maxa
j − mina
j) n ≤ 2γ,V a
j incr.
5 Negotiation strategies
The aim of agent a’s negotiation strategy is to determine the best course of
action which will result in an agreement on a contract x that maximises its
scoring function V a. In practical terms, this equates to how to prepare a new
counter oﬀer.
In our model we consider that the agent has a representation of its mental
state containing information about its beliefs, its knowledge of the environment
(time, resources, etc.), and any other attitudes (desires, goals, obligations, inten-
tions, etc.) the agent designer considers appropriate. The mental state of agent         
a at time t is noted as MSt
a. We denote the set of all possible mental states for
agent a as MSa.
When agent a receives an oﬀer from agent b it becomes the last element in
the current negotiation thread between both agents. If the oﬀer is unsatisfactory,
agent a generates a counter oﬀer. As discussed earlier, diﬀerent combinations of
tactics can be used to generate counter oﬀers for particular issues. An agent’s
strategy determines which combination of tactics should be used at any one
instant. Hence, the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition3. Given a negotiation thread between agents a and b at time tn
over domain X = X1 × ...× Xp, with x
tn
a↔b = {...,x
tn
b→a}, and a ﬁnite set of
m tactics11 Ta = {τi|τi : MSa → X}i∈[1,m],aweighted counter proposal is
any lineal combination of the tactics that generates the value at time tn+1 in
the thread. That is, for issue j
x
tn+1
a→b[j]=γj1τ1(MStn+1
a )[j]+γj2τ2(MStn+1
a )[j]+...+ γjmτm(MStn+1
a )[j]
such that for all issues j,
 
i∈[1,m] γji = 1 and x
tn+1
a↔b = {...,x
tn
b→a,x
tn+1
a→b}
Given a set of tactics, diﬀerent types of negotiation behaviour can be obtained
by weighting the tactics in a diﬀerent way. That is, by changing the matrix Γ –
particular to each negotiation thread:
Γt
a→b =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
γ11 γ12 ...γ 1m
γ21 γ22 ...γ 2m
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
γp1 γp2 ...γ pm
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
An example of when this weighted combination may be useful is when mod-
elling a smooth transition from a behaviour based on a single tactic (e.g. Boul-
ware, because the agent has plenty ot time to reach an agreement) to another
one (e.g. Conceder, because the time is running out). Smoothness is obtained
by changing the weight aﬀecting the tactics progressively (e.g. from 1 to 0 and
from 0 to 1 in the example).
We model many-parties negotiations by means of a set of interacting negoti-
ation threads. The way this is done is by making a negotiation thread inﬂuence
the selection of which matrix Γ is to be used in other negotiation threads. Thus,
Deﬁnition4. Given a,b ∈ Agents, t ∈ Time, a’s mental state MSt
a, and Γt
a→b,
a Negotiation Strategy, is any function f of the following type:
Γ
t+1
a→b = f(Γt
a→b,MSt
a)
11 This deﬁnition uses the natural extension of tactics to the multi-dimensional space
of issues’ values.        
A simplistic example of the application of our model would be to have a
matrix Γ built up of 0s and 1s and having Γ
t+1
a→b = Γt
a→b for all t. This would
correspond to using a ﬁxed single tactic for each issue at every instant in the
negotiation.
6 Convergence results
Convergence in negotiation is achieved when the scoring value of the received
oﬀer is greater than the scoring value of the counter oﬀer the agent intended to
respond with. That is,
Deﬁnition5. A Negotiation thread x
tn
a↔b = {...,x
tn
b→a} converges at time tn+1
iﬀ V a(x
tn
b→a) ≥ V a(x
tn+1
a→b)
With this deﬁnition in mind, we have obtained some preliminary results
on convergence for a single variable, single tactic, bilateral negotiation. Wider
convergence criteria will be forthcoming as future work. The second proposition
(6.2) is particularly interesting because it allows an agent using a time-dependent
tactic to know if the negotiation will converge with an agent playing relative Tit-
For-Tat. Knowing if an opponent is playing Tit-For-Tat can easily be guessed by
using a strategy that makes some initial random oﬀers and then examines the
responses.
Notice, however, that convergence cannot be guaranteed in general. For ex-
ample, two agents using a Tit-For-Tat tactic might stay negotating forever if no
limitation on time is established.
Proposition6. If two agents a and b negotiate values for an issue j
over the value regions [mina
j,maxa
j], [minb
j,maxb
j], satisfying [mina
j,maxa
j] ∩
[minb
j,maxb
j]  = ∅, then the following properties hold:
1. If a and b follow a time-dependent tactic with V a
j decreasing (resp. increas-
ing), V b
j increasing (resp. decreasing) and ta
max = tb
max then the negotiation
for issue j converges.
2. If a uses a time-dependent tactic with V a
j increasing (resp. decreasing)
and b uses a relative Tit-For-Tat tactic with V b
j decreasing (resp. increas-
ing), and a starts the negotiation thread, then the negotiation converges if
x
t1
a→b[j]x
t2
b→a[j] < (mina
j)2 (resp. if x
t1
a→b[j]x
t2
b→a[j] > (maxa
j)2).
Proof. (1) We prove it for V a
j decreasing, the other case is similar. We have
[mina
j,maxa
j] ∩ [minb
j,maxb
j]  = ∅, then maxa
j > minb
j. When time runs out the
α(t) functions of both agents become 1, that is αa
j(ta
max)=αb
j(tb
max) = 1 and
then their acceptance values will become mina
j + αa
j(t)(maxa
j − mina
j)=maxa
j
and minb
j +( 1− αb
j(t))(maxb
j − minb
j)=minb
j. So, b will make the oﬀer
x
t
b
max
b→a [j]=minb
j at the deadline. But given that a uses a monotonically decreas-
ing function and maxa
j > minb
j we have V a
j (maxa
j) >Va
j (minb
j). In other words,      
by using the assumption ta
max = tb
max we have V a
j (x
t
a
max
b→a [j]) >Va
j (x
t
a
max
a→b [j]). So
the negotiation converges.
(2) Again we prove it for V b
j increasing, the other case is similar. Without
loss of generality assume that the thread is:
x
tn−1
a↔b = {x
t1
a→b,x
t2
b→a,...,x
tn−1
a→b}
and that δ = 1. By using the deﬁnition of relative Tit-For-Tat, it can be seen
that:
x
tn
b→a[j]=
x
tn−3
a→b[j]
x
tn−1
a→b[j]
x
tn−2
b→a[j]=
x
tn−3
a→b[j]
x
tn−1
a→b[j]
x
tn−5
a→b[j]
x
tn−3
a→b[j]
x
tn−4
b→a[j]=
=
x
tn−3
a→b[j]
x
tn−1
a→b[j]
x
tn−5
a→b[j]
x
tn−3
a→b[j]
...
x
t1
a→b[j]
x
t3
a→b[j]
x
t2
b→a[j]=
x
t1
a→b[j]
x
tn−1
a→b[j]
x
t2
b→a[j]
The thread converges if V b
j (x
tn−1
a→b[j]) ≥ V b
j (x
tn
b→a[j]), but given that V b
j is
monotonically decreasing, this happens only if x
tn
b→a[j] <x
tn−1
a→b[j]. Then, by sub-
stituting we get
x
t1
a→b[j]
x
tn−1
a→b [j]
x
t2
b→a[j] <x
tn−1
a→b[j], that is x
t1
a→b[j]x
t2
b→a[j] < (x
tn−1
a→b[j])2.
But when time approaches ta
max we have limt→ta
max xt
a→b[j]=mina
j (by V a
j be-
ing increasing). So, at the limit, if x
t1
a→b[j]x
t2
b→a[j] < (mina
j)2 the negotiation
converges.
7 Related work
Research in negotiation models has been pursued in diﬀerent ﬁelds of knowledge:
game theory, social sciences and artiﬁcial intelligence. Each ﬁeld has concentrated
on diﬀerent aspects of negotiation, making the assumptions that were pertinent
for the goal of their study. In game theory, researchers have been interested
in mechanism design: the deﬁnition of protocols that limit the possible tactics
(or strategies) that can be used by players. For instance they are interested
in deﬁning protocols that give no beneﬁt to agents that mis-represent or hide
information [9]. In this work disclosure of information is acceptable, because
by doing so it will beneﬁt the agent in ﬁnding an optimal solution for itself.
Contrary to our model, and as we discussed in Section 2, this is an inappropriate
assumption from the point of view of real applications. As has been argued
elsewhere [10], these and other assumptions limit the applicability of game theory
models to solve real problems.
Our interests lie in invertigating the process of negotiation among agents and
not only on the outcome. Hence, our study, and those forthcoming, are much
more in the experimental line of [4]. Although we do not concentrate on learning,
some similarities can be found with the formalism by Zeng and Sycara [10].
We have not concentrated however on the description of negotiation protocols
that has been an important focus of attention for the community of distributed
artiﬁcial intelligence (see [7] for extensive references).      
8 Discussion and future work
The next stage in the development of our model is to undertake an experimental
evaluation of the tactics and strategies described herein. We believe adequate
strategies have to be developed in accordance with the desired properties and
characteristics of the domain at hand. These strategies then need to be tested
in repeated games over a range of typical scenarios to determine which are the
most successful. Some initial modeling of concrete strategies has been made
considering several variables in the mental state of an agent: (i) an approxima-
tion of the ﬁrst and second derivatives of the other agent’s behaviour, (ii) the
relation between both negotiating agents (e.g. members of the same company,
boss/employee, ...), and (iii) the time remaining to reach an agreement (in this
case time is playing a role at both strategic and tactic levels). This model is
being used in the real modeling of the domain presented in Section 2. Currently
there are two versions of the model implemented in CLIPS and PROLOG.
The initial results on convergence, although simple, encourage us to make a
more complete analysis of the types of negotiation situations that are likely to
occur.
We have identiﬁed many research opportunities in extending the model. For
instance, fuzzy control techniques could be used to relate a qualitative estimate of
the ﬁrst and second derivatives of the opponent and a qualitative value for the β
to be used in a tactic; we imagine a rule like: If the agent concedes quite a lot (ﬁrst
derivative) and the agent concession ratio (second derivative) increases then Beta
is Medium. Genetic algorithms could also be used to determine experimentally
which weighted combinations of tactics survive better in the line of [4]. Moreover,
genetic algorithms may help to determine which negotiating agents show the
desired behaviour by using the strategies as the genetic code. Finally, case-based
reasoning could be used to model strategies. The case memory could be used by
the agent to determine which past combinations of tactics worked best in similar
circumstances.
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